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CASENOTES

GREGGORY

D.

CLEVELAND*

Transnational Securities Fraud:
Are the United States Courts
Closing Their Doors

to Foreign Plaintiffs?
1. The Facts
Klaus Zoelsch, a West German citizen, along with an unspecified number of other West Germans,' participated in a complex investment and
tax shelter program known as "Condo Conversion III. ' '2 Under the plan,
the investors placed their capital either directly into a West German limited
partnership, Dr. Loescher und Co. KG (Loescher), or indirectly through
investment payments to a West German accounting firm. 3 The investors
understood that their funds would be funneled through these entities to
a United States limited partnership based in Miami, Florida, known as
First American International Real Estate Partnership (FAIR). 4 FAIR then

invested the funds in property and condominium conversions in Memphis,

5
Tennessee, and Atlanta, Georgia.
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I. Brief for Appellant Klaus Zoelsch at 2, Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d
27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5351) [hereinafter Appellant]. When Zoelsch filed the suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, he brought the action on behalf of himself,
all other persons similarly situated who invested in the program, and as assignee of the
claims of thirty-one other investors in the program.
2. Id. at 3. This program was specifically designed to solicit investment participation
by West German citizens and residents and was marketed exclusively to them.
3. Id. The firm was ICT Wirtschaftpruefungsgesellschaft G.m.b.H. of Munich, a limited
partner of Loescher, acting as trustee.
4. Id.
5. Id.

1172

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Loescher and the FAIR entered into an investment agreement and, in
September 1981, Loescher commissioned Arthur Andersen & Co.
6
G.m.b.H. (AA-W. Ger.), a West German limited liability corporation, to
7
prepare an audit report. The audit report, dated September 29, 1981,
8
identified AA-W. Ger. as its author on the signature page. The report
included an analysis of the FAIR's written description of the American
investments. 9 Loescher solicited investments by distributing to prospective investors a package of materials containing the audit report and other
materials prepared by FAIR.")
None of the statements, facts, opinions, and conclusions in the materials
distributed to prospective investors by Loescher were attributed to Arthur
Andersen & Co. (AA-USA). I I AA-USA was not directly involved in the
solicitation of these investors or in preparing any documents that induced
purchasers of the securities.' 2 AA-W.Ger. made only one reference to
AA-USA in the audit report and this reference constituted the only connection between AA-USA and the materials distributed by Loescher.13
Klaus Zoelsch, on behalf of himself and as assignee of the claims of
thirty-one investors against Andersen (all citizens of the Federal Republic
of Germany), brought this action in federal court in the District of Columbia on July 31, 1985.14 Zoelsch claimed misrepresentation by virtue
of the reference to AA-USA in the audit; he sought relief under the federal
securities laws and alleged federal jurisdiction on the bases of diversity
of citizenship and federal claims. 15 The district court dismissed the action,
and Zoelsch appealed the court's refusal of jurisdiction over the federal

6. Id. Zoelsch claimed that Arthur Andersen & Co. was a worldwide single entity and
AA-W.Ger. was merely a branch establishment.
7. Id.
8. Brief for Appellee Arthur Andersen & Co. at 6, Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5351) [hereinafter Appelleel. The audit report also
contained the individual signatures of two German nationals employed as auditors by AAW.Ger. in Munich.

9. Appellant, supra note I, at 4.
10. Id.

II. Appellee, supra note 8, at 7.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 7. The audit report had to be translated because it was in German. The parties
disputed the translation of the reference to AA-USAI which appeared on page 17 of the
audit report. Zoelsch's translation read: "with respect to a number of data and particulars
in the prospectus in conjunction with the economic fundamentals we have made inquiries
thereabout by way of our branch-establishment Arthur Andersen & Co., Memphis." Id.
Andersen contended that the translation should have read: "with respect to some general
prospect data relating to the overall environment we have made inquiries through the office
of Arthur Andersen & Co., Memphis." Id.
14. Appellant, supra note I. at 2.
15. Id.
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claims. 16 Held, affirmed: A securities law claim against a defendant who
acted in the United States when the securities transaction occurred abroad
and no effect was felt in this country will not support American court
jurisdiction. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
I!. The Legal Background
A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RULE

10B-5

Federal courts have given no clear answer on the question of to what
extent the antifraud provisions of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule lOb-5' 7 apply to security dealings involving both foreign and
domestic action. International law principles limit American courts' ability
to regulate international conduct.1 8 Under traditional principles of international law a state could assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring within
its boundaries 19 and over extraterritorial conduct that had domestic
2
repercussions. 0
The American Law Institute (ALl) proposed a revision of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 1981.21 Section 416 of the Draft Restatement, set

forth four jurisdictional tests: I. a transaction occurring in a U.S. securities market; 2. representations or negotiations conducted in the United
States; 3. the issuer's securities traded in a securities market in the United

16. Id. at I.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1987). The Rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce. or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
ta) To employ any device, scheme. or artifice to defraud.
Ib) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made. in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Id.
18. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible

construction remains").
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 17 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. According to § 17(a), any conduct within a nation's
territory may serve as a basis for jurisdiction. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 18. Section 18 provides:

21.

[al state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if ... (bti) the conduct and its effect are
constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies: (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foresecable result of the conduct outside the tet ritory; and liv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT].
WINTER 1988
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States; and 4. defendants or other persons to be protected are U.S. citizens or residents. 22 These tests incorporate the traditional "conduct"
and "effects" tests with one important change. These tests are subject
to a rule of "reasonableness." 23 Jurisdiction under the first test is deemed

reasonable, 24 while the remaining three tests are subject to section 403(2)
of the Draft Restatement regarding the reasonableness of asserting juris-

diction. 25 Under the section 403(2) reasonableness requirement courts
must balance between competing interests. In order to determine the
appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction, courts must weigh the U.S. interest in the "foreign" dispute against the interest of restraining extension
26
of U.S. substantive law to judge the dispute.

The legislative history27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 and
the Act's general antifraud provision, section 10(b) 29 have.provided the

courts with little guidance. The SEC has given even less guidance re30
garding rule 1Ob-5.

22. Id. § 416 provides:
(I)Any transaction in securities carried out. or intended tobe carried out, on a securities market in the
United States is subject to United States jurisdiction to prescribe. regardless of the nationality or place
of business ofthe participants in the transaction or of the issuer of the securities.
(2) As regards transactions in securities not on a securities market in the United States, but where
(a)securities ofthe same issuer are traded on a securities market in the United States: or
(b)representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the United States in regard to the
transactions, or
(c)the party subject to the regulation is a United States national or resident, or the persons sought
to be protected are residents of the United States, the authority of the United States to exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe depends on its reasonableness in light of evaluation under Section 40342).

23. Id. § 403(2).
24. Id. § 416().
25.

Id. § 416(2). Section 416(2) requires that the reasonableness provision of § 403(2) be

applied to it. Section 403(2) provides that:
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the relevant factors,
including:
(a)the extent to which the activity (i)takes place within the regulating state, or i0) has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state:
(b)the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and
the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom
the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c)the character ofthe activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state.
the extent to which other states regulate other activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation isgenerally accepted;
(d)the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation in question:
(e)the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
f)the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system.
(gIthe extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity:
(h)the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id.

§ 403(2).

26. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1464 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
27. The legislative history indicates little about § 10(b) except that it is designed as an
antifraud catch-all. See Hearingson Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
29. Id. § 78j(b).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1987); see supra note 17.
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JUDICIAL APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL
SECURITIES FRAUD

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is considered the leading
source of judicial analysis in the securities area. 3 1 In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook 32 the court upheld jurisdiction based on the domestic effects
of the conduct. In Schoenbaum an American shareholder claimed that
corporate executives of a Canadian-based company, which was listed on
the American Stock Exchange, violated rule lOb-5 by issuing shares to a
Canadian co-defendant for an inadequate consideration. Despite the absence of any illegal conduct in the United States, the court based its
finding of jurisdiction on the effect the fraudulent activity had on the value
33
of the plaintiff's stock.
In Leasco Data Processing Eqtuipment Corp. v. Mawel134 the court
seriously diminished the possibility that Schoenbaum would be liberally
interpreted to include any security transaction in the world in which an
American shareholder was involved. 35 In Leasco, the court upheld jurisdiction under the "conduct" test. 36 Leasco involved foreign defendants
who made material misrepresentations to an American plaintiff in the
United States. In both of these cases the courts sought to protect Americans; thus, they found it relatively simple to impose the protections of
rule lOb-5.
The Second Circuit then faced the more difficult question of what circumstances would warrant jurisdiction if the injured party were a foreigner. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc. 37 plaintiffs brought a class action
on behalf of persons who had purchased common stock in a Canadian
corporation. The plaintiffs included American investors living in the United
States and abroad, as well as foreign investors. The court held that U.S.
jurisdiction did not exist "where acts simply have an adverse effect on
the American economy or American investors generally." 38 For jurisdic-

31. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (referring to
Second Circuit as "Mother Court" in securities area); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium
Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en

banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
33. 405 F.2d at 208.
34. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).

35. In dictum the court stated: "IT]he language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act is much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules
governing conduct throughout the world in every instance where an American .. .bought
or sold a security." Id. at 1334.
36. Id.
37. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
38. 519 F.2d at 989.
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tion to be based on domestic effects, the effects must be a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct. 39 The court further held that the transaction must directly injure specific purchasers or sellers. 40 The Bersch
court found jurisdiction over both the American resident plaintiffs and
the defendants. Jurisdiction over the American plaintiffs existed because
the prospectuses upon which they relied were mailed into the United
States from abroad.41 The court conferred jurisdiction over the defendants
with regard to the American citizens residing abroad because the defendants had engaged in "prepatory activities" in the United States and these
activities were significant contributors to the plaintiffs' losses. 42 With
respect to the foreign investor plaintiffs, the court held that the same
conduct would warrant jurisdiction only if "acts (or culpable failures to
act) within the United States directly caused [their] losses." 4 3 In lIT v.
Cornfeld 44 the Second Circuit discussed the factors to be considered in
determining whether losses were caused by a particular activity. The court
recognized expressly that the "[d]etermination whether American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners depends not only on how much
was done in the United States but also on how much (here how little)
45
was done abroad."
Other circuits considering questions of transnational securities jurisdiction have expanded the Second Circuit's test by looking only to whether
the alleged conduct was prepatory or significant. 46 Relying on the distinction between significant and prepatory 4 7 acts allows other circuits to
find subject matter jurisdiction on almost any act in the United States
that furthers a fraud.

39. RESTArEMENT, supra note 19, § 18(b).
40. 519 F.2d at 989.
41. Id. at 991.
42. Id. at 993.
43. Id.

44. 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 920.

46. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th
Cir. 1979) (partial negotiation and final signing of a contract in the United States satisfied
the conduct test); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), (no domestic effects because victim
of allegedly fraudulent conduct was a corporation entirely owned by Canadian Province of
Manitoba; yet the court found a sufficient basis for jurisdiction based on the negotiation
and execution of a contract in New York), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
47. In Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1979), the court distinguished between "prepatory" and "significant" and held that where an American parent of a defendant company merely knew of
an attempted cover-up of the fraud by the defendant, the situation was not significant enough
to warrant jurisdiction.
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III. The Court's Analysis-Zoelsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co.

Since this precise issue had never been presented to the D.C. Circuit,
Judge Bork divided his opinion into two parts. Judge Bork devoted the
first part of the opinion to adopting a test for the D.C. Circuit to determine
when American courts should exercise jurisdiction over transnational
securities claims. 4 8 The second part applied the court's newly adopted
50
49
to Zoelsch's claims.
test

A.

THE TEST ADOPTED

As long as it does not overstep the boundaries of the Due Process
Clause, Congress can prescribe the limitations of federal jurisdiction to
enforce the federal securities laws. 51 Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act addressed the issue surrounding when American courts have jurisdiction
over extraterritorial transactions involving securities.52 Section 30(b),
53
however, does not address the unique question presented to this court.

The court next turned to an analysis of existing case law. The D.C.
Circuit noted that those courts that had previously addressed the issue

had based jurisdiction of extraterritorial conduct on both conduct 54 and
effects. 55 The court, however, decided that an analysis of the "effects"
test was unnecessary because Zoelsch had not argued that jurisdiction
could be premised on domestic effects caused by foreign conduct. 56 After

rejecting other tests, 57 the D.C. Circuit explicitly adopted the Second
Circuit's test 58 for finding "jurisdiction over domestic conduct that is

48. 824 F.2d at 31.
49. The court adopted the Second Circuit's test for finding jurisdiction based on domestic
conduct. Id. at 33.
50. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982).
52. Id. § 78dd(b) (1934 Act, sttpr note 28, § 30(b)). Section 30(b) states that the 1934
Act: "shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
to prevent the evasion of this chapter." Id.
53. 824 F.2d at 30.
54. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200. 206-208 (2d Cir.), modified on other ground-'.
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
55. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991-93 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
56. 824 F.2d at 31.
57. Id. at 30.
58. Id. The court characterized the Second Circuit's test: "jurisdiction is appropriate
when the fraudulent statements or misrepresentations originate in the United States, are

WINTER 1988
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alleged to have played some part in the perpetration of a securities fraud
59
on investors outside this country."
In its reasoning the court stated that "legislation of Congress ...is

meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
...based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with

domestic conditions. ' 60 Similarly, the main purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to protect American investors and markets. 6' Here,
the court also cited Section 30(b) 62 of the 1934 Act to support its contention that the statute "does not apply to persons transacting business
in securities abroad unless the Securities and Exchange Commission issues rules and regulations making the statute applicable to such persons.
....,63 From this the court inferred that Congress was interested in protecting only American investors and markets. 64 Furthermore, because the
SEC has never promulgated any rules or regulations of this type, the Act
65
applies only to American investors and markets.
The court rejected the balancing test of the Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States Section 403(2)66 because

"such tests are difficult to apply and inherently unpredictable." 67 Moreover, the opinion goes on to say that if the Second Circuit were not the
preeminent court in the field of securities law, 68 the D.C. Circuit court
would probably never assert jurisdiction when domestic conduct caused
losses to foreign investors. 69 In the D.C. Circuit's view, courts should
not try to divine Congress's intention but rather look to see "what jurisdiction Congress in fact thought about and conferred." 70 Congress could
easily have conferred this type of jurisdiction on the federal courts; but
since Congress did not, this lack of action implies that the courts should
not exercise such jurisdiction. 7' Because of the Second Circuit's preemmade with scienter and in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and 'directly
cause' the harm to those who claim to be defrauded, even if reliance and damages occur
elsewhere." I. at 33.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id. at 31 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); See also Sandberg

v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738
F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-ai-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. 824 F.2d at 31.

62.
63.
64.
65.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1982).
824 F.2d at 32.
Id.
Id.

66. See supra note 25.
67. 824 F.2d at 32 n.2.
68. See supra note 31.

69. 824 F.2d at 32.
70. Id.

71. Id.
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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the Zoelsch court deferred
inence in the field of securities law, however,
72
to the Second Circuit and adopted its test.
The Zoelsch court characterized this new test as "a slight recasting
.. . of the traditional view"

73

and stated that: "jurisdiction is appropriate

when the fraudulent statements or misrepresentations originate in the
United States, are made with scienter and in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, and 'directly' cause the harm to those who74 claim to
be defrauded, even if reliance and damages occur elsewhere."
B.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST

The D.C. Circuit concluded that if any fraud actually occurred, it occurred in West Germany and therefore any damage or reliance occurred
there also. 75 The appellant first contended that AA-USA and AA-W.Ger.
were "branch-establishments" 76 and could be held liable for each other's
failed to raise this issue on apmisrepresentations. 77 Since the appellant
78
it.
address
to
declined
court
the
peal,
The appellants next contended that AA-USA "willfully and recklessly"
failed to provide material information to AA-W.Ger. 79 Zoelsch alleged
that AA-USA could have foreseen that its misrepresentations would harm
future purchasers and that the damages would not have occurred absent
the misrepresentations. 8" The court rejected this argument, noting that
AA-USA's statements "were not themselves made for distribution to the
public" but rather made to AA-W.Ger., who credited AA-US when drawing up its report. 8' The court found it significant that AA-USA was only
one of many sources upon which AA-W.Ger. relied and that the audit
report was certified by AA-W.Ger. alone. 82 The court held, therefore,
that any misrepresentation made by AA-USA was not "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security; ' 83 and since section 10(b)

72. The court went on to say that it would be more likely to find jurisdiction in a case
brought by the SEC than one brought by a private foreign individual. The court reasoned
that the SEC would be more likely to take foreign policy concerns into account. Id. at 33
n.3.
73. Id. at 33. The court claimed that the test would not decide the jurisdictional issue
along with the merits.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 34.
76. See supra note 13.

77. 824 F.2d at 34.
78. Id.
79. Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.
80. Id. at 14.

81. 824 F.2d at 34.
82. Id.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
WINTER 1988
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presupposes this requirement, no liability under that section could be
found. 84 The D.C. Circuit, following the Second Circuit,85 held that the
plaintiff must show that the alleged fraud induced him to engage in the
transaction and caused economic harm. 86 Since AA-USA's statements
never reached Zoelsch, the court concluded that such statements could
87
not have induced him into the transaction.
Zoelsch's final argument urged the court to consider all activities in the
United States in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. 88 The court summarily dismissed this argument as "antithetical" to the test the court had
adopted in that the argument did not relate to the 1934 Act's purpose of
protecting American investors and markets. 89 In conclusion, the court
found that AA-USA's statements did not directly induce anyone into
transacting business and since AA-USA's statements were not meant for
public disbursement, AA-USA had not violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934.90 Thus, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 9'
IV. Practical Implications and Conclusions
The court in Zoelsch could have reached the conclusion that it did
without adopting such a restrictive test. The connection between AAUSA's activities and the alleged fraudulent scheme was so slight that even
under a less restrictive test the court would have found no basis for
jurisdiction. By adopting such a restrictive test the court virtually closed
the door on many potentially valid claims by foreign investors. 92 Indeed,
had it not been for the preeminence of the Second Circuit in the area of
transnational securities fraud, the court might have adopted an approach
that would never confer jurisdiction when the plaintiff comes from foreign
country.

93

The court further displayed this attitude in its analysis of the Securities
Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5. Since neither Congress nor the SEC directly
84. 824 F.2d at 34.

85. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
86. 824 F.2d at 35 n.5.
87. Id.
88. Appellant, supra note I, at 9.
89. 824 F.2d at 36.

90. Id. ("We therefore find no theory of liability in Zoelsch's complaint that supports
American federal jurisdiction over the securities law claims brought against this defendant.").
91.

Id.

92. Unless the acts alleged by the defendant "directly cause" the injury and are made
for disbursement to the public, the defendants acts will be seen as "merely prepatory" and
not substantial. Id. at 35.
93. Id. at 32.
VOL. 22, NO. 4
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expressed guidelines for jurisdiction over extraterritorial fraudulent conduct, the court inferred that courts should never exercise jurisdiction (or
only in exceptional cases) when considering claims by injured foreign
residents. 94 Since, however, the Securities Act expressly applies to foreign
commerce, this type of application should be proper.95 Indeed, another
circuit stated: "[i]t is an absurd notion that Congress intended activity
...to be exempt from the provisions of the securities acts simply because

96
the victims are not American citizens."
Courts have advanced three policy rationales for the conduct test. First,
Congress did not intend that the United States become a haven in which
fraudulent activities could be aimed against foreign citizens. 97 Second, if
American courts find jurisdiction when only foreign citizens have been
harmed yet there has been significant domestic activity, other nations
might "take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate
frauds in the United States." 98 Finally, the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act should seek "to elevate the standard of conduct in securities transactions.'' 99
Had it adopted a balancing test as enumerated in the Draft Restatement, 100 the court could have accomplished the policy rationales developed for the "conduct" test and yet allowed courts to remain open to
address the potential wrongs committed against foreign citizens. Section
416 of the Draft Restatement enumerates the threshold level of domestic
conduct necessary before a court may apply securities regulations to
extraterritorial conduct.' 0' These provisions differentiate between the tests
on the basis of reasonableness. Under this reasonableness requirement
courts should analyze interests, examine links, and search for the center
of gravity of the activity. 102 This approach would allow courts to balance
all interests involved and assert jurisdiction when the situation warranted.
The D.C. Circuit noted the reasonableness of this approach and stated:

"[t]his examination

. . .

satisfies the prohibition of international law against

unreasonable assertion of jurisdiction."

03

94. Id. at 29-30.
95. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
96. United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).

97. lIT v. Vencap. Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001. 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); 548 F.2d at 116.
98. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116; see also Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409. 421 (8th Cir. 1979).
99. ContinentalGrain, 592 F.2d at 421; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

101. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
102. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at 93.
103. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 952 n.169 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
WINTER 1988
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Many federal courts have faced the difficult problem of deciding when
to assert jurisdiction over transnational securities activities. Courts could
facilitate this decision by adopting the balancing test of the Draft Restatement, thereby eliminating the "per se" unfairness to foreign citizens
of the present approach.
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